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Introduction
The potential for economic regulation to distort the incentives of the …rm to innovate is well known (e.g., Sweeney, 1981; Cabral and Riordan, 1989) . Most of the literature examining regulation and innovation focuses on the impact of the type of regulatory regime (rate of return vs. incentive regulation, for example) or on the frequency of policy revision (the so-called "regulatory lag").
A little-explored avenue is the e¤ect of regulatory delay on innovation. 1 Regulatory delay exists when the regulator does not allow the introduction of new products without regulatory review and approval. Regulated …rms-for example, in the telecommunications industry-often claim that regulatory delays are long, costly, and distort the incentives to introduce new products. The impacts may also run in the other direction: the …rm's innovation decisions may reveal information to the regulator, which might adjust regulatory delay in response. This direction of causality-from …rm's innovation to regulator's policy-is neglected in the literature to my knowledge. This paper provides one explanation for changes in regulatory delay and the timing of the …rm's innovation.
The regulator adjusts delay over time as the …rm, through its timing of innovation, reveals information about the cost of delay. The model developd places empirically testable restrictions on the evolution of innovation delay and regulatory delay.
Recent history in the telecommunications industry shows that innovation and regulatory delay change over time. In the data from the beginning of the 1990's from four midwestern states examined here, a given new product tended to be introduced in di¤erent areas at di¤erent times; by the end of the decade product launches were more likely to be simultaneous. Many state regulatory commissions have modi…ed their policies over time to allow products to reach the market sooner.
This pattern also shows up in these data. There are at least three possible explanations for the shift in the …rms' and the regulators' behavior. First, perhaps the agents were not choosing the optimal innovation timing and regulatory delay at …rst, and later they were. Second, it may be 1 that the agents were optimizing, but that changing circumstances (i.e., parameters in the objective functions) changed the optimal actions. Third, and most economically interesting, the agents may hold private information, and have adjusted their actions over time in response to information revealed by the other agent. In this paper I focus on this third explanation, by means of a signaling model.
There are regulator-side and …rm-side components to the delay between technological feasibility of a product and its introduction to consumers. The regulator-side component is the time between the …rm's submission of a new product to the regulator for approval and the granting of approval.
I term this component regulatory delay (the term is not intended to be pejorative; delay may have social bene…ts). The …rm-side component is the time between the …rst technologically feasible introduction date 2 and the submission of the product to the regulator. I term the …rm component innovation delay. While regulation obviously creates regulatory delay, it may also in ‡uence innovation delay. Regulatory delay reduces the opportunity cost of innovation delay by pushing the forgone pro…ts from the new product farther into the future. When innovation costs fall over time, regulatory delay thereby induces the …rm to postpone innovation.
The regulator trades o¤ the bene…t of reducing regulatory delay (quicker return on investment for the …rm and earlier accrual of bene…ts for consumers) and the costs (loss of regulatory control, potentially lower quality of service, harm to competing …rms, and the like). The trade-o¤ depends in part on the cost that regulatory delay imposes on the …rm, which is likely to be known by the …rm better than the regulator. When the …rm knows that the regulator would reduce regulatory delay if it knew the true cost of delay to the …rm, then the …rm would like to communicate its private information to the regulator. The …rm can signal its cost of delay with an action that cannot be pro…tably mimicked by a …rm with di¤erent cost. A costly action available to the …rm is innovation delay. In particular, departures from the myopically optimal length of innovation delay (where "myopic" means decision-making taking regulatory delay as …xed) can serve as signals to 2 I.e., the …rst date at which the introduction costs are less than in…nite.
the regulator.
For innovation delay to serve as a signal, it must be at least partially observable to the regulator.
The regulator is not likely to know when products are technologically feasible. If the …rm operates in several jurisdictions (e.g., a Bell Operating Company spanning several states), and the …rm chooses to introduce new products at di¤ering times in the various jurisdictions, each regulator learns from observing the …rm's actions in the other jurisdictions. Once the product is introduced in one area, the regulator in another jurisdiction knows that introduction is technologically feasible. 3 The …rm can then use the time until subsequent submission for approval in the other jurisdictions as a signal.
By jointly modeling the determination of regulatory and innovation delay, this article breaks new ground. The earliest literature on regulation and the timing of innovation looked at a monopolist's incentive to innovate given a …xed regulatory regime (Braeutigam, 1979) . More recent work focuses on adoption timing as entry deterrence or accommodation under di¤erent regulatory regimes (Riordan, 1992; Lyon and Huang, 1995) , but does not explicitly consider regulatory delay. This paper leaves aside rivalry considerations to focus on the relationship between the regulator and the …rm. There are a few empirical studies of the impacts of regulatory delay on innovation (Prager, 1989; Prieger, 1999) , but these focus on aspects other than asymmetric information and signaling. Spiegel and Wilkie (1996) consider a model in which investment in a new technology has signaling value in a regulated environment, although the receiver of the signal in their model is the capital market, not the regulator.
The model may also apply to other regulatory settings, such as the timing of patenting and patent approval, or of pharmaceutical development and regulatory approval. With minor modi…cations to the objective functions, the model may also apply to decision-making within a …rm, where the agents are the R&D division and management, in place of the …rm and the regulator, respectively. In this setting consumer surplus would not enter management's objective function. In each of these settings, there is asymmetric information and the possibility of signaling and learning over time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I introduce a basic model of a …rm's decision of when to introduce a new product given the regulatory environment, and then embed the model in a two-period signaling game. Section 3 presents the testable implications derived from the signaling model. Testing of the predictions is carried out in Section 4 with data from a Bell Operating Company. The results show that the signaling model is consistent with the evolution of innovation delay and regulatory delay in all states tested.
The Theoretical Model

A basic model with …xed regulatory delay
To develop a simple model of regulated product introduction, let time t = 0 represent the point at which a …rm can …rst feasibly introduce a given product. The …rm chooses to submit the product to the regulator for approval at time s¸0, at which time it incurs …xed development (or adoption) cost F(s). The length of innovation delay s will be referred to as the innovation date. 4 Following Riordan (1992) , …xed costs are assumed to be falling over time as exogenous technological advances lower the cost of adopting the new service: F 0 (t) < 0 and F 00 (t) > 0. Falling …xed costs give the …rm an incentive to delay innovation. The regulator approves the service after an examination period (i.e., regulatory delay) of length a. Consumers cannot purchase and …rms cannot sell the good until time s +a, referred to as the introduction date. After time s +a, the …rm earns constant ‡ow pro…t of ¼(µ) per unit time, where µ 2 £ ½ R is a parameter known to the …rm but not the regulator. 5 I assume that ¼ 0 (µ) > 0, so larger µ might correspond to higher demand or to lower marginal costs. Note that ¼ is not an explicit function of price; to focus on the strategic variable 4 Whether s represents true innovation or merely adoption of existing technology (di¤usion), the resulting game is the same. 5 The timing of the model is similar to that of Braeutigam (1979) .
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s I assume that the …rm is allowed by the regulator to charge the pro…t-maximizing price, 6 which will be a function of µ. The …rm's discount rate is r, so that its net present value of introduction at time s is:
The …rm chooses optimal innovation date s ¤ (a; µ) = arg max s ¦(s; a; µ) which is de…ned by the …rst order condition (FOC): 7 @¦(s; a; µ)
The left side of equation (2) is the marginal bene…t (MB) from postponing innovation (the reduction in …xed costs), and right side is the marginal cost (MC) of the same (the forgone pro…t). Thus the …rm's private information about µ can be interpreted as information about the opportunity cost of innovation delay (or, equivalently, of regulatory delay) to the …rm.
Given the assumptions of the model, these propositions follow (proofs are in an appendix).
Proposition 1 @¦=@a < 0 and @s ¤ =@a > 0. Longer regulatory delay lowers the …rm's pro…t and induces the …rm to innovate later.
As regulatory delay increases (e.g., from a L to a H in Figure 1 ), the forgone pro…t is pushed farther into the future and its present value, which is the MC of delay, falls. Since MB is decreasing, to re-equate MC and MB later innovation dates are chosen by the …rm. Thus there is a multiplier associated with regulatory delay: adding a day to a increases a+s, the date the service is introduced to consumers, by more than a day.
Proposition 2 @s ¤ =@µ < 0. A higher opportunity cost of delay induces the …rm to innovate earlier.
6 Many of the new telecommunications services introduced in the data are classed as "competitive" services and are allowed to be freely priced by the …rm. 7 To guarantee s
The relevant picture is the same as Figure 1 , where now the top MC curve corresponds to a higher µ and the bottom MC curve corresponds to a lower µ. At …rst this result might appear counterintuitive; if regulation is "bad for the …rm" why would higher regulation-induced costs lead to earlier innovation? The answer is to distinguish between the direct and opportunity costs of regulation. It is the opportunity costs of regulation that µ measures; as the forgone pro…t from delay increases, the …rm innovates earlier to speed accrual of those pro…ts. If the direct cost of the regulatory process is included as a constant in F, then an increase in direct cost would postpone innovation. This can be seen from Figure 1 by shifting the MB of delay curve up.
A signaling model
In this section I present a two-period model of innovation and regulation that incorporates the interaction between the …rm's choice of innovation date and the regulator's choice of regulatory delay. Stage 1 of the game is the basic model above, where the initial level of regulatory delay, a 0 2 R + , is predetermined. To present the issues involved, I …rst discuss a simpli…ed model that highlights the role of signaling. In this …rst model, the …xed cost F is taken to be constant and nonprohibitive, so that the …rm wishes to introduce the product immediately. Thus the only potential value of innovation dates after time 0 is to signal the …rm's type. The …rm's choice variable is the stage 1 innovation date s 2 R + .
In stage 2, there is another new product opportunity, identical to that in stage 1. The regulator chooses a new level of delay, a 2 R + , then the …rm observes a and selects an innovation date s 2 2 R + for the second new product. The timing of the game allows the …rm to signal its type (taken to be …xed over stages) to the regulator in stage 1 to in ‡uence the regulatory delay in stage 2. 8 The assumption of constant …xed cost is relaxed later, in section 2.3.
The players in the game are the following.
The …rm The …rm's pro…t in each stage is (1), except that now F (s) is constant. It is clear that, absent declining …xed innovation costs and a signaling value to s, the optimal s is zero. Total discounted pro…t is ¦ sum (s; s 2 ; a 0 ; a; µ) = ¦(s; a 0 ; µ) + ±¦(s 2 ; a; µ)
The discount factor ± is determined from r and the (exogenous) time elapsing between stages (the period of regulatory commitment). For simplicity, take £´fµ
, so that there are just two types: a low-cost type L and a high-cost type H. As above, "cost" here refers to the opportunity cost of regulatory delay and is known only by the …rm.
The regulator The regulator's objective function may represent either social welfare (the "benevolent dictator" framework) or the utility function of the regulator (the "economic theory of regulation" approach to regulation (Peltzman, 1976) ). Given that a 0 is predetermined, only stage 2 welfare is relevant. Take expected welfare in stage 2 to be
E µ represents expectation taken with respect to the regulator's posterior beliefs b about the …rm's type. CS(t; µ) is net consumers' surplus when the product is introduced at time t and the …rm's type is µ. I assume @CS=@t < 0, @CS=@µ¸0, @ 2 CS=@t 2¸0 , and @ 2 CS=@t@µ · 0. 9 The …rm's type a¤ects CS at least indirectly because the monopoly prices charged are a function of µ. If µ represents a demand parameter, then µ will also have a direct impact on CS. V is the bene…t to the regulator from regulatory delay, with V 0 > 0.
The interpretation of V varies with the interpretation of the regulator's objective. In a benevolent dictator setting, V may represent bene…ts not re ‡ected in CS from higher quality or lower level of externalities that may result from regulatory delay. 10 In a political economy setting, V might represent payo¤s (direct or indirect) to the regulator from the …rm's rivals or a preference for exercising authority.
Solution concept
The relevant solution concept in this Spence-type signaling game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). 11 A PBE consists of the …rm's strategies s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ) for s and s ¤ 2 (a; µ) for s 2 , a strategy a ¤ (s) for the regulator, and the regulator's posterior beliefs b(s) about the probability
given the posterior beliefs and the regulator's correct expectation that s 2 = s ¤ 2 (a; µ), and ² the beliefs b(s) are derived from Bayes' rule whenever possible.
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Note that the strategic variables of interest are s, the signal by the …rm in stage 1, and a, the response by the regulator in stage 2. There will be no strategic considerations in the …rm's choice of s 2 , since it is the last move in the game. I restrict my focus to cases of successful signaling: separating equilibria. As is well-known in signaling games, the PBE may admit too many "unrealistic" equilibria because it does not restrict beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Multiple equilibria do not complicate testing the theory empirically, because in section 2.3 I show that all separating equilibria share certain testable characteristics.
The regulator's strategy Because the PBE is sequentially rational, we may use backward induction to solve the game. In the …nal move of the game, the …rm chooses s ¤ 2 = 0 no matter 1 1 I restrict attention to pure (non-random) strategies. 1 2 In particular, on the equilibrium path, b = 1 if µ = µL in a screening equilibrium (the regulator learns the …rm's true type) and b cannot be updated in a pooling equilibrium (the regulator retains its prior beliefs when it receives an uninformative signal). Bayes' rule does not apply o¤ the equilibrium path, since there is no probability of ending up there.
what µ or a ¤ is; with constant …xed costs, the …rm always prefers immediate innovation. Given that s ¤ 2 = 0 and that stage 1 actions are bygones, the regulator will choose a ¤ as
the stage 2 welfare maximizing choice given the posterior beliefs after observing signal s from the …rm. If a ¤ > 0 and W is continuous in a, the optimal choice of regulatory delay thus satis…es
Ignoring the expectation operator in (4) for the moment, the FOC is
Only the direct e¤ect of a on ¦ need be considered, since s ¤ 2 does not change with a. The term on the left side is the MB of delay for the regulator. The right side terms compose the regulator's MC of delay, which is equal to the MB at a ¤ .
Of central interest for characterizing a separating equilibrium is how a ¤ changes with µ. Some additional notation will be useful. V is assumed concave, the MB of delay for the regulator is decreasing in a. However, the MC of delay for the regulator is also decreasing in a. The MC curve when the …rm is type H is above the MC curve when the …rm is type L, given the assumptions in the model. Which downward-sloping MC curve intersects with the downward-sloping MB curve at the smallest a therefore depends on relative slopes of the MB and MC curves. The assumptions of the model do not say which curve is steeper. Thus the optimal regulatory delay could either be increasing or decreasing in the …rm's type, and the sign of a L ¡ a H is indeterminate. I develop results for both cases.
Consider the outcome of a separating equilibrium. Assume that the predetermined a 0 is between a L and a H . 13 Since the sign of a L ¡ a H is ambiguous, the sign of a ¤ ¡ a 0 is also ambiguous in 1 3 As it would be, for example, if a ¤ is monotone in µ and a 0 is stage-optimal given the prior beliefs of the regulator. The …rm's strategy Looking ahead to a ¤ (s), the regulator's policy, the …rm wishes to signal its type when doing so will cause the regulator to reduce regulatory delay from a 0 . Take …rst the case where a L < a H . The low cost type L has an incentive to signal its type to receive a L rather than a H , since lower a is always better for the …rm. Since both types would set s = 0 to myopically maximize stage pro…t, the low cost type "burns money" to signal by setting an
For the signal to be part of a separating equilibrium, signaling must be costlier for H than for L. First, the high cost …rm must …nd it less pro…table to send signal s L to induce a L than to send 0, which induces a H :
Both sides are positive: the left side is the second period gain from fooling the regulator into believing the …rm is low cost, and the right side is the …rst period gain from not doing so. This incentive constraint places a lower bound on s
is too low the high-cost type will not …nd the signal too costly to mimic.
The other incentive constraint is for the low cost type. The signal s L must be such that the gain from signaling reaped in stage 2 outweighs the lost pro…t in stage 1:
This incentive constraint places an upper bound on s L : if it is too high L will …nd the signal too costly to send.
As long as the upper bound on the signal s L (de…ned by equality in IC2) is above its lower bound (de…ned by equality in IC1), a separating equilibrium exists. 15 The appendix proves existence for this model. Figure 2 depicts a PBE when a L < a H . In the …gure, pro…t increases toward the origin because both a and s are costly to the …rm. IC1 is depicted by the isopro…t curve for H that goes through point (0; a H ). 16 The pro…t for H from sending the signal s L and receiving a L in return must be lower than the pro…t from the myopically optimal s = 0 and receiving a H in return. and receives a > a 0 in stage 2 as a result.
1 5 The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) can be invoked to eliminate all separating equilibria except the unique Pareto-dominating one, which has the least-costly signal (the lower bound de…ned by IC1). The empirical predictions from the model do not depend on whether the separating equilibrium is the Pareto-dominating one. 1 6 The isopro…t curves shown in (s; a) space assume that s2 = s ¤ 2 (a). The appendix shows that the isopro…t curves have the convex shape shown in …gure 2.
1 7 Many other strategies for the regulator would also support this separating equilibrium, as long as the heavy dashed line in …gure 2 is between a L and a H , above both isopro…t curves, and passes through (s L ; a L ).
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Extending the signaling model: time-varying …xed costs
In dynamic industries such as telecommunications, it is more realistic to assume that the …xed costs of innovation are not constant but are falling over time. With this extension, a separating equilibrium may exist even if a L > a H , unlike the constant …xed cost case. Consider the model from section 2.2 but with the declining …xed costs from section 2.1. The sign of a L ¡ a H is still indeterminate (see the appendix). An added complication when innovation costs are falling is that the isopro…t curves are no longer monotonic in (a; s) space. However, it is still true that in any separating equilibrium, type L signals with a higher s than type H when a L < a H , and vice-versa
Figure 3 depicts the isopro…t curves representing the two incentive compatibility constraints.
Lower isopro…t curves represent higher levels of pro…t. As before, IC1 prevents signal s L (which results in a L ) from giving more pro…t to H than does s H 1 = s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ H ) (which results in a H ). The relevant isopro…t curve for H is the one passing through the point (s H 1 ; a H ), and IC1 excludes L's signal from being between A and C on the graph. IC2 prevents L's signal from giving less pro…t to L than does s L 1 , the stage-optimal s. The relevant isopro…t curve for L is the one passing through the point (s L 1 ; a H ), and IC2 restricts L's signal to be between B and D on the graph. Thus an incentive compatible separating equilibrium requires L's signal to be between C and D. Figure 4 shows one possible separating equilibrium. In the …gure, the signal s L is the least costly incentive- When a H < a L instead, then the separating equilibrium has H signaling with a low s (see 1 8 Other strategies for the regulator would also support this separating equilibrium; see footnote 17.
Figure 5 for one possible equilibrium and the appendix for details). In this case, the …rm innovates quicker than would be stage optimal, to signal that delays have a high cost to the …rm.
The results for the model with time-varying …xed costs are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 4 In the signaling model with time-varying …xed costs, if a separating equilibrium exists, then: The results in Proposition 4 concerning ¢s´s 2 ¡ s follow from Proposition 1, which shows that the stage-optimal s increases with a. In the third bullet point, ¢s is indeterminate: although the decrease in a will ensure that s 2 < s H 1 , the stage 1 signal also may be below s H 1 to meet IC2 for H.
Empirical Predictions and Data
The theoretical model generates predictions for the evolution of innovation and regulatory delay.
The results from the signaling model in section 2.3 depend on whether a H is greater than a L , which in turn depends on second derivative of V . An observer (i.e., the econometrician) will not know Note that the model required that the pro…t, cost, and consumers' surplus functions were the same in both stages. In the empirical application, then, I control for variables that a¤ect these (size, density, and wealth of the market, etc.). Controlling for di¤erence in pro…t, cost, and consumers' surplus isolates the impact of regulatory delay on innovation.
Data were collected on innovation and introduction dates for new telecommunications services o¤ered by Ameritech in four of its state jurisdictions: Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 19 Ameritech, one of the Bell regional holding companies, is the dominant local exchange company in each of these states, and its intrastate activities are regulated by the state commissions. Introduction of a new service required petitioning the state regulator; the service could not be o¤ered to subscribers until regulatory approval was granted. Examples of the residential and business services in the data are new voice mail features, virtual networking services, and high-speed transmission services. The data cover the span 1991 through 1999, which comprises three regulatory periods. 20 In the …rst period, 1991 through mid 1994, Ameritech was under some form of rate of return regulation in each state. Following this …rst period, each state switched to some form of 1 9 The data are from the tari¤ …ling logs of the company and the state commissions. Supplemental information was culled from the actual state tari¤s where needed.
2 0 The data for Ohio are complete only for years 1994-1999. 14 incentive regulation. After three years of the new regulation, in 1997 the regimes were reviewed in at least some of these states. 21 Thus the regulators had three opportunities to change their regulatory delay policy (i.e., to change a). Preliminary statistical work revealed that the latter two periods were indistinguishable in terms of average a and s, and so I take stage one of the game to correspond to the …rst period and stage two of the game to correspond to the latter two periods.
The …rst di¢culty for the empirical investigation is how to measure s, time between potential and actual innovation ("innovation delay"). I take the date at which a service is …rst introduced in any of these states to be t = 0, and then measure s for the other states relative to the …rst state's innovation date. 22 This e¤ectively underestimates true innovation delay: the true time 0 must be weakly before the observed …rst "innovation" under this de…nition. However, this measurement corresponds to the portion of innovation delay that the regulator actually observes, which is the only useful part for signaling, and therefore is a good measurement of s as used in the model.
To apply the single-…rm single-regulator theoretical model from the previous section, it is assumed that there are no strategic e¤ects among jurisdictions. To be included in the data set, a new service had to be introduced in at least two states. One hundred fourteen services were introduced in at least two states, generating 349 observations. Summary statistics for the observations on s are in Table 2 . Regulatory delay, a, is measured as the time from the …rst tari¤ …ling submission date to the approval date of the last tari¤ …ling for the service.
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Summary statistics for a are in Table 3 .
The Empirical Tests
The goal of the empirical work is to test the predictions from the signaling model summarized in Table 1 . To this end, I calculate ¢s, ¢a, and attempt to infer the type of the …rm where it matters 2 1 See Roycroft (1999) for more information on the regulatory regimes. 2 2 Some access services were introduced in the federal access tari¤ before in any of the state tari¤s. In such cases s is calculated using the federal access tari¤ …ling date as t = 0 (and an indicator for these observations, FAT, is used in the statistical work).
2 3 Some services had multiple tari¤ …lings and withdrawals before approval was granted. Regulatory delay data is not available for Ohio.
for the tests.
Estimating the change in innovation delay
From the raw data in Table 3 it appears that innovation delay dropped substantially from stage 1 to stage 2. I estimate the entire distribution of innovation delay in the states in the two stages via a nonparametric method (Figure 8) . 24 The …gure presents the survival curves (de…ned to be 1 ¡ CDF) and reveals convincing evidence that stage 2 s stochastically dominates stage 1 s. Estimated means and medians from the curves are in Table 4 , and con…rm the visual evidence from the curves: the mean and median innovation delay is smaller in each state in stage 2. Although the con…dence intervals for the medians are non-overlapping only in Indiana and Wisconsin, if a slightly higher quantile is chosen, e.g. the 0.6 quantile (which corresponds to the ordinate 0.4 on the survival curves), the con…dence intervals are non-overlapping in all states. Thus it appears that ¢s < 0 in each state.
Since the nonparametric method does not allow covariates, I turn next to a semiparametric model to control for economic conditions and other factors that may change over time and in ‡uence the …rm's behavior apart from the strategic considerations that I want to isolate. Estimates from a Cox proportional hazards model are in Table 5 . In the Cox model, the hazard rate of the innovation delay durations is¸(
where¸0 is an arbitrary, unspeci…ed baseline hazard and x i is a vector of covariates for spell i. (INDPAT t¡1 ). These covariates are allowed to evolve over the course of a duration. Adding these variables does not remove the conclusion that ¢s < 0 except for Illinois, for which the coe¢cient loses signi…cance. Formally, one cannot reject the hypothesis that ¢s > 0 in Illinois at the 5% level. Taken together, then, the evidence from all estimations indicates that ¢s < 0, except possibly in Illinois.
Estimating the change in regulatory delay Evidence on the change in regulatory delay between the two periods comes from several sources. The …rst evidence comes from the institutional changes that took place in 1994. In each state, expedited approval for new services received special attention in the new incentive regulation plans. In Illinois, new services deemed competitive were allowed to be introduced on one day's notice, and many more services were classi…ed as competitive after the regulatory change. In Indiana, all new services were allowed to be introduced on one day's notice, down from at least a month of regulatory delay before the new plan. In Ohio, competitive services were e¤ectively detari¤ed and allowed to be introduced with essentially no regulatory scrutiny. In Wisconsin, approval for most new services was to be granted after 10 days unless suspended for investigation, down from about a month under rate of return regulation. The intent of the new regulation was to ensure that ¢a < 0.
Another source of evidence is to examine the data themselves. Table 3 shows that the mean and median tari¤ approval delay dropped in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin (no data are available for Ohio), so it appears that ¢a < 0. Estimation results lead to similar conclusions. The survival curves for the regulatory delay data (Figure 9 ) indicate that stage 2 a stochastically dominates stage 1 a. Estimated means and medians from the curves are in evidence (for ¢a) suggests that this is also not the case in Ohio. Thus the signaling model is consistent with the evolution of innovation delay and regulatory delay in these three states.
For Illinois, the negative coe¢cients on ¢s and ¢a are not signi…cant in all estimations, so we cannot immediately reject the possibility that we have case 2, 3, or 4 from Table 1 . Consider these cases in turn. Case 2 poses no problem for the signaling model; it is consisten with the theory.
Case 3 is consistent with the model only if the …rm is type H.
Can anything be inferred from the data, then, about the …rm's type in Illinois? Once one controls for di¤erences across states, then within a stage the di¤erence in (average) s across states will be driven by di¤erences in µ. So in an estimation that controls for di¤erences in the pro…t opportunities among states, any residual …xed e¤ects for the states would give information about µ. In particular, if both types are present in the data, then the state with the largest negative …xed e¤ect, and therefore the shortest innovation delay after controlling for pro…tability, is type H. This follows from Proposition 2; type H …rms will have shorter innovation delay than type L …rms. Controls for pro…tability include economic and demographic covariates such as those used in the innovation delay estimation above, and also expected regulatory delay. 28 The estimation results are in the …nal column of Case 4 rejects the model regardless of the …rm's type. To formally test the hypothesis that ¢s < 0 and ¢a > 0, I applied Wolak's (1991) testing methodology for inequality constraints in non-linear models. The p-value from the test using the "IL:reg change" coe¢cients from the …xed e¤ects models is 0.10. The p-value from the test using the coe¢cients from the covariate models is 0.36. 29 Neither test convincingly rejects the Case 4 hypothesis. For Illinois, then, we are left with institutional, nonparametric, and semiparametric evidence that Case 1 applies, but also with semiparametric inference too weak to reject that Case 4 might apply.
Conclusion and Further Directions
This paper presents a model that endogenizes innovation timing and regulatory delay. The …rm uses the timing of new product introduction to signal the marginal cost of regulatory delay to the regulator. In a separating equilibrium, the regulator responds to the revealed information by 2 8 The variable measuring expected regulatory delay for each observation is constructed assuming the …rm believes regulatory delay is exponentially distributed (with rate¸). The expectation is calculated given observed completed and ongoing delays with Bayesian updating. The prior distribution for¸is taken to be Gamma (the conjugate prior). Regulatory delay data is not available for Ohio and those observations are dropped.
2 9 In neither the innovation delay nor the regulatory delay estimations can a preferred model be selected (between the …xed e¤ects and covariates versions); Vuong's (1989) test for non-nested model selection indicates that neither is preferred to the other. adjusting regulatory delay. The model generates testable predictions, which are not rejected by data gathered from a Bell Operating Company's operations in four states. The evidence for one of the states, however, is mixed.
Of course, the empirical evidence does not rule out all other explanations for the observed evolution of innovation and regulatory delay. However, external evidence on the changing attitudes of regulators supports the model. Over the last decade, regulatory commissions (in some cases prodded by state legislatures) have placed more emphasis on the bene…ts from new products. The older breed of regulatory o¢cial, accustomed to tight regulatory control and a stable industry, viewed new products with suspicion. As one regulator put it, "...regulation of telecommunications remain essential to protect the public from deleterious consequences of innovation..." (Oppenheim, 1991, p.310) . Contrast this view with the more recent goals adopted by regulators in the Ameritech region to "...facilitate the introduction of innovative new services in this competitive marketplace." (PSC of Wisconsin, 1998, p.47) This change of attitude about the importance of new products to consumers and …rms corresponds to the case in the model in which the regulator learns that the MC of delay is high. In that case (Case 1) the model shows that both innovation and regulatory delay fall over time, which is exactly what happens in the data.
There are two interesting extensions to the model that deserve future attention. First, in the current formulation actions undertaken in one jurisdiction have no signaling value to regulators in the other jurisdictions (apart from alerting regulators that a certain service is technologically feasible after it is introduced in the …rst state), and the …rm's decision is taken to be independent across states. A logical next step for the model is to expand the signaling game to include multiple receivers of the …rm's multiple signals. Whether such a model will generate predictions restrictive enough to falsify the model remains to be seen.
Another extension would be to explicitly incorporate unregulated rivals into the model. The only impact of competition in the current model is indirect: it may a¤ect the MC of delay to the …rm (µ) or the regulator's bene…ts of delay (V ). Given that local telecommunications competition was just getting o¤ the ground during the period studied, including competition in the model seems to be most useful for application to future data sets. Wolak, Frank A. (1991) , 'The Local Nature of Hypothesis Tests Involving Inequality Constraints in Nonlinear Models', Econometrica 59(4), 981-995.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 First, from (1), @¦=@a = ¡e ¡ra ¼(µ) < 0. Second, letting s ¤ (a; µ) = arg max ¦(s; a; µ), we can …nd @s ¤ =@a by di¤erentiation of (2), since (2) holds for all a:
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on F (i.e., F 0 < 0 and
Proof of Proposition 2 The marginal cost of delay to the …rm is the same whether the delay stems from the …rm's or the regulator's choice. We can …nd @s ¤ =@µ by di¤erentiation of (2), since (2) holds for all µ:
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on F. Is a L < a H ? Assume for the moment that the …rm's type is known (as it will be in a separating equilibrium), so that (7) represents the …rst-order condition for the welfare-maximizing a. Then the impact of a marginal change in type on the regulator's choice of delay may be found by di¤erentiating (7), since (7) holds for all µ. Integrating the resulting da ¤ =dµ over the discrete change in type from µ L to µ H tells us whether a L < a H or vice versa. The derivative of (7) with respect to µ is:
Recall that by assumption we have @CS i =@t < 0, @CS i =@µ¸0, @ 2 CS i =@t 2¸0 , and @ 2 CS i =@t@µ · 0. The other elements required to sign (13) are
is linear or convex, da ¤ =dµ is unambiguously positive. However, the more natural assumption would be that V (a) is concave (i.e., that the marginal bene…t of delay to the regulator declines as delay increases), and thus the sign of da ¤ =dµ is ambiguous in general.
If the sign of a marginal change in type is ambiguous, then so is the sign of a discrete change in type from L to H . Thus the sign of a L ¡ a H is not known.
Isopro…t curves when …xed costs are constant Here I show that the isopro…t curves in …gure 2 must slope down. The slope of an isopro…t curve in (s; a) space is found from (3), which expands to ¦ sum = e ¡rs [¡F + e ¡ra0 ¼(µ)=r]+± [¡F + e ¡ra ¼(µ)=r] (recall s 2 is zero in equilibrium).
It follows that the slope is ¡ @¦sum @s
, which is always negative because @¦ @s < 0 and @¦ @a < 0. Di¤erentiating the slope with respect to s reveals that the curves are convex:
Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium with constant …xed costs If the participation constraint is met, a separating equilibrium always exists when a L < a H . Whenever the isopro…t curves of the two types cross, L's has the ‡atter slope (a "single-crossing" property).
To show this, note that from (14), the slope of an isopro…t curve changes with µ as
If ¼ is a positive function, integrating (15) between µ L and µ
H
shows that the sign of the nonmarginal change between the two types is negative. Thus H has a steeper downward-sloped isopro…t curve than L at every point of crossing. Then the isopro…t curves must be as depicted in Figure 2 , and the "L" signal is too costly for type H to send but not too costly for L to send. The incentive constraints are satis…ed and a separating equilibrium exists.
The sign of da ¤ =dµ with time-varying …xed costs The derivative of (7) with respect to µ in this case leads to an expanded expression for da ¤ =dµ:
Given that (13) was of indeterminate sign, it is no surprise that (16) is also indeterminate.
Isopro…t curves with time-varying …xed costs As above, the slope of an isopro…t curve in (s; a) space is ¡(@¦ sum =@s)=(@¦ sum =@a) = ¡(@¦=@s)=[±(@¦=@a)]. Since the denominator is negative, the slope is positive to the right of s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ) and negative to the left (recall that from (2), @¦=@s evaluated at s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ) is zero). Thus the isopro…t curves take a maximum at s L 1 for L and s H 1 for H , as depicted in …gures 2 and 3. The slope changes with µ as
The signs of the unambiguous pieces are @¦ @a < 0 (as noted in the proof of Proposition 1), @ 2 ¦ @a@µ = ¡e ¡r(a+s2) ¼ 0 2 < 0, and
The only term that changes sign with s is @¦ @s , which as noted above is positive for s < s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ) and negative for s > s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ). Thus to the left of s ¤ 1 (a 0 ; µ), (17) is negative, meaning that for a marginal decrease in type from type H, the slope gets steeper.
By implication, whenever the isopro…t curves of the two types depicted in Figure 3 cross to the left of s H 1 , then the curve for H is ‡atter than the curve for L. Therefore, any separating equilibrium with a H > a L has L sending a larger signal s than H sends and s L¸sL 1 > s H 1 . The case ruled out would have L's signal lower than s H 1 (depicted in Figure 6 ). The only way L's signal could be lower than s H 1 is if point B is to the left of point A. In that case L's signal could be between B and A. But then there must be a point E where the two isopro…t curves cross, and at E, H's curve is steeper. Since E must be to the left of s H 1 , the proposition states that the H curve must be ‡atter, so point E creates a contradiction.
To the right of s ¤ , the sign of (17) is ambiguous.
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The single-crossing condition with time-varying …xed costs When a H < a L we want to rule out the (nonintuitive) case in which H signals with a high s. To the right of the peaks of the isopro…t curves, the sign of (17) is ambiguous, and H's curve might cross L's curve again (see Figure 7) . As in the constant …xed cost case, a single-crossing condition rules out this behavior.
The single-crossing condition for time-varying …xed costs is essentially the same as (15) 
